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Lifecycle Impact of Alternative Higher Education Finance 
Systems in Ireland 
 
With increasing numbers of young people participating in higher education in Ireland and a 
heavy reliance of higher education institutions on state funding, the introduction of an 
alternative finance system for Ireland has been muted over the past number of years. 
However, no study has been conducted to gauge the potential impact of such measures. In 
this chapter we utilize a dynamic microsimulation model developed for Ireland to simulate the 
impact of both an income contingent loan system (ICL) and a graduate tax system from a 
fiscal and redistributional viewpoint and to analyze the repayment length under the former 
system. Our results suggest that an ICL system would is more equitable, while the graduate 
tax system would be a better alternative from a fiscal viewpoint. The results also illustrate the 
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1.  Introduction  
Over the past 15 years Ireland has experienced rapid growth in higher education 
participation, with student numbers increasing from 86,624 to 155,000 in the period 
1994 to 2010 and expected to grow to 204,000 by 2018 (Department of Education and 
Science, 2010). Within Ireland, the vast majority of third level funding is provided by 
the state (85% for the year 2007, OECD 2010). Given the high private returns to 
education (Barrett et al, 2002) and the current difficult fiscal situation within Ireland, 
alternative forms of higher education financing have been suggested by the OECD 
(2006), the Department of Education and Science (2003) and the Hunt Report (2011). 
The aim of this paper is to utilize a dynamic microsimulation model for Ireland and 
explore the fiscal and redistributive implications of a number of alternative higher 
education finance structures, with varying assumptions regarding the parameters of 
these systems. 
Since the mid 1990s there has been a general move by developed nations towards 
shifting the burden of higher education costs upon the student and away from the 
state. This is seen with table 1 below, where the OECD average state share of total 
expenditure on tertiary education over the period 1995-2007 falling from 86% to 
under 70%. The only exception is Ireland, where the public share has risen from 70% 
to 85%, due to the free tuition fees initiative for undergraduates introduced in 1996. 
Before this, the majority of undergraduate students had to pay tuition fees that were 
based upon the manner of course being pursued and institute attended. These fees 
were replaced with a much lower flat ‘registration fee’ which stood at €190 (IR£150) 
in 1996, and has risen to €1500 by 2010. The shortfall in revenue for third level 
institutions this created was filled by government finances and so a substantial shift 
towards reliance on state funding by these institutions was created.  
Meeting the objective of increasing the percentage of the Irish labour force with a 
third level qualification from 33% in 2008 to 48% in 2020 (Future Skills Needs, 
2007) will require significant extra resources. In addition participation in higher 
education participation is not equal, with  higher socio-economic groups such as 
professional backgrounds having a disproportionate share of third level admissions 
relative (O’Connell et al, 2006). Clancy (1997 and 2001), using data on college 
entrants, highlighted that this pattern did not change with the introduction of the free 
fees scheme.  
Both a graduate tax scheme and an income contingent loan system have been 
suggested as possible alternatives to the current free fees scheme with  the National 
Strategy for Higher Education to 2030
1 (2011) recommending that the latter system 
be introduced in Ireland in the near future. In an international context, empirical work 
has been carried out most notably for the UK and Australia to gauge redistributive and 
fiscal implications of introducing such systems. To date, no study has been conducted 
that attempts to analyse the implications of an alternative higher education finance 
structure in an Irish context  
                                                 
1 This is also commonly known as the Hunt report In this paper we utilize a dynamic microsimulation model for Ireland and explore the 
fiscal and redistributive implications of a number of alternative higher education 
finance structures, with varying assumptions regarding the parameters of these 
systems. In the next section we will provide a brief overview of the economic theory 
behind the nature of funding for third level education and also analyze the various 
finance options available for higher education. We next investigate these options in an 
international context and explore their applicability in an Irish setting.  We then 
briefly outline LIAM, the dynamic microsimulation model to be used. The 
methodology of simulating two higher education finance structures using LIAM 
follows. We then present our results and conclude. 
2.  Student Loan Options for Higher Education Finance 
In understanding the impact of funding choice, the concepts of efficiency and equity 
are important considerations (Barr, 1993). In terms of efficiency, an examination of 
the private and social benefits and costs to higher education is relevant in relation to 
the balance between public and private funding. Graduates of higher education on 
average extract a significant private return as a result of higher lifecycle earnings and 
greater employment prospects
2. Thus from an efficiency viewpoint, an individual 
should contribute towards the costs of this education. However, both society and the 
state may also derive benefits from more tertiary-education individuals due spillover 
externalities, higher taxes, lower unemployment and better social outcomes such as 
lower crime (McMahon, 2004). As a result, there is an efficiency justification for the 
state to subsidise the cost of participation.  
The burden of who pays what amount from an efficiency viewpoint can be illustrated 
with figure 1. This shows different amounts of the marginal private benefit, the 
marginal social benefit and the marginal cost of education against various enrolment 
levels. The two benefit measures are downward sloping as the benefits of education 
are assumed to fall as enrolment levels rise, while the marginal cost of education rises 
as enrolment levels increase. Also, we note that in figure 1 the marginal social benefit 
is assumed to be outside the private benefit, this is due to the possible positive 
externalities education may induce. 
Theory would suggest that the individual must pay up to the point where his/her 
marginal private benefit equals the marginal cost of education, however, this may lead 
to a socially inefficient level of education being taken on, show by point A in figure 1 
and corresponding to enrolment level E1. For the socially optimum amount of 
education to be admitted, enrolment level E2, theory would suggest that the taxpayer 
should provide funds up to the point where the marginal cost of education equals the 
marginal social benefit. The optimal size of the subsidy provided by the state is given 
by the distance between P1 and P2, and will be dependent on the size of the relative 
private and social benefits to this education. However, the precise estimation of both 
private and social benefits to higher education is complicated, especially when the 
possible externality effects of tertiary education are taken into consideration 
(Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2004). This leads to a degree of uncertainty as to the 
                                                 
2 For instance in an Irish context Barrett et al (2002) found that those with a diploma or degree could 
earn up to 80% more then an individual with just primary education complete. From an international 
perspective on the private return to education, see Psacharopoulos (1993), Card (1999) and Harmon at 
al (2002).  optimal level of government funding towards higher education but does suggest that 
students that extract a private benefit from higher education should bear some of the 
cost towards it. In an Irish context, it may be argued that this has not been the case 
due to the existence of free tuition fees for higher education and so inefficiencies may 
exist.   
Inefficiencies may also arise due to market failure within education. Imperfect capital 
markets combined with uncertain future gains from higher education may entail that 
talented individuals pass all necessary tests to be admitted to third level education but 
may not be able to afford to pay any private charge on education, leading to enrolment 
inefficiencies. This market failure can affect the equity of access perpetuating income 
inequalities.  If lower income groups are excluded from participating, the resulting 
differential lifecycle earnings will lead to wealth inequalities in a society persisting. 
Subsidies for higher education, by reducing the credit constraint faced by students 
may see more from lower incomes participate. However if subsidies do not overcome 
the disincentives faced by lower income groups, then they effectively become 
transfers to the rich. Thus as noted by Clancy (1997, 2001) and O’Connell (2006), the 
free tuition scheme because of the persistent socio-economic participation 
differentials, results in a net transfer to the top of the income distribution.  
Student Loan Options 
We now discuss alternative higher education financing options. To help achieve the 
goals of equity and efficiency and provide some private funding within higher 
education finance a wide range of finance options for higher education are available. 
While options such as grant schemes, education vouchers and tuition fee schemes 
exist within these options
3, in this paper the focus is upon two main instruments of 
income contingent based finance options, namely 
 
•  Income contingent loans (ICL) with risk sharing and 
•  Graduate taxes.  
In this section we first outline the basic principles of a student loan system and then 
describe in detail both a graduate tax and risk sharing ICL system. 
A student loan system attempts to reduce credit constraints associated with higher 
education participation and potentially reduces inequalities from state funding of 
higher education. Students generally receive a loan to cover the cost of their education 
with repayment made from labour market earnings, with the repayments ending once 
the loan has been repaid in full or upon retirement. There are two basic forms of 
student loans within this format with the main distinction between whether the level 
of debt and/or the level of repayments account for the income of the graduate. The 
type of student loan system that will take account for the graduate’s income in some 
manner is known as an income contingent loan (ICL) system, while those that do not 
are known as mortgage style loans
4. A number of variants of around these basic tenets 
                                                 
3 Please see Greenway and Haynes (2004) for more details on education vouchers, grant allocations 
and tuition fees. 
4 See Johnstone (2005) for more details on the mortgage style student loans exist with Chapman (2005) and Barr (1993) presenting a detailed discussion of these
5. 
However, gauged in terms of the applicable in an Irish context, the proposals outlined 
previously in an Irish context (HEA, 2009; Department of Education, 2003; Hayes, 
2009) and for parsimony, it was decided this paper will focus specifically upon the 
potential impact of a risk sharing ICL system and a graduate tax system in Ireland.  
Income Contingency with Risk Sharing 
A form of ICL that is typically associated with public financing is a risk sharing ICL. 
With this system graduates are obligated to repay a maximum amount in present value 
terms and entails that the size and frequency of repayments are linked to income 
levels, with no repayments after the individuals has cleared his/her own debt is 
cleared. Within this structure the costs of non payment are shared by the tax payer and 
the graduate. As the externalities involved with higher education benefit society as a 
whole, placing some of the financial burden on taxpayers does satisfy an efficiency 
argument. The graduate will face some burden of default (d) as generally the loan 
they receive will be augmented to reflect some probability of default; however, this 
will not vary as he/she goes through their lifecycle. Therefore the graduate will 
generally face repaying  
t D Payment × + = ) 1 (           (1) 
Where D is the default probability across the cohort and t is the initial loan for tuition 
purposes and can be seen as MC-X, where MC is the marginal cost of the education 
and X is the value of the externalities involved with extra education. As noted earlier, 
the exact breakdown of the private/public contributions to this debt is difficult to 
estimate, however, if all of these parameters are set appropriately the government will 
receive the full tuition loan t. If they have not it could be the case that non-higher 
educated taxpayers pay more than they should
6, or they could see a revenue windfall, 
depending on the total level of debt each student is burdened with and the default rate. 
Although this system does generally entail some graduates will pay more than others 
in terms of total repayments, sharing the risk of an ICL with the taxpayer can help 
deal with problems of adverse selection and moral hazard that may arise with a risk 
pooling system. With the taxpayer and not the graduate meeting the default, there is 
no danger for the borrower if his/her future incomes rise. Therefore it is less likely for 
a high ability student to opt out of this system, and also graduates with higher incomes 
will less incentive to divert away from income benefits and higher paying jobs as the 
amount they repay is not linked to the income of others in the cohort (Chapman, 
2005). There still may exist some issues of adverse selection with this system as those 
that expect high earnings may still opt out to avoid paying Dt from equation 1 above. 
The problem of adverse selection can be reduced through a mandatory system of ICL 
such as exists in Australia. Also as Chapman (2005) notes, the risk sharing is 
generally seen as being administered by the government, it would have the advantage 
of an efficient collection system through income taxation or social insurance schemes.  
Various forms of income contingent loan systems have been introduced in Australia, 
New Zealand and the UK respectively over the past 25 years, and evidence would 
                                                 
5 These include human capital contracts and an ICL system with risk pooling 
6 Measured against the benefits they enjoy from the externalities from higher education suggest that each has had no little or no affect on the composition of those 
participating in higher education across social or income class in a positive or 
negative manner (Chapman, (2005) and Office for National Statistics, 2004). 
However, it could be suggested that they have successfully placed some of the 
financial burden of higher education upon the student, while removing some of the 
reliance on the state of tertiary education funding.  
Graduate Taxes  
Another income contingent instrument is a graduate tax system. This is similar to an 
ICL system in that students do not face an upfront charge when they enter higher 
education and so the credit constraint is removed; however, there is no loan aspect in 
the design. Instead, the graduate tax acts as a supplementary tax/compulsory payment 
on graduates throughout their working life. In its simplest form this system may 
obligate graduates to pay a fraction of their taxably income, in addition to income tax, 
to the government until they retire (Barr, 1993). Although such a system can be 
designed to incorporate an income contingent element (such as most income tax 
systems) the key difference with the ICL stems from the fact there is no cost recovery 
aspect to the graduate tax system with the likelihood that some individuals may end 
up paying more than the cost of their education under this system of graduate tax. A 
related point is that the amount graduates pay is invariant in costs between degrees. 
As the graduate tax continues throughout the working life of the graduate it could act 
in the same way income tax does and be a disincentive to work. Also with a graduate 
tax system, as Greenaway and Haynes (2004) note, if the graduate tax is not 
hypothecated, higher education institutions still reliant on state finance and the 
possible political obstacles that go with this. A graduate tax system does have 
advantages in that it could be efficiently collected through the income tax system and 
it has scope to raise considerably revenue for the government. However, as a graduate 
tax system has not been implemented anywhere in the world yet suggests that the 
inefficiencies caused by the problems outlined above poses questions about its 
viability.  
Both the finance options outlined above provide various merits in terms of helping to 
place more of the financial burden upon the individual and away from the state, in 
removing the initial credit constraint an individual may face when deciding to enter 
higher education and increasing efficiency relative to a situation of free tuition fees. 
Also, gauged in terms of the applicable in an Irish context and the proposals outlined 
previously in an Irish context (HEA, 2011; HEA, 2009; Department of Education, 
2003; Hayes, 2009), investigating the impact of a risk sharing ICL system and a 
graduate tax system in Ireland would appear a valuable exercise.  
3.  Methodology 
Microsimulation in ex-ante higher education policy analysis 
With the implementation of various forms of higher education finance options in 
different countries over the past 20 years, numerous studies have attempted to gauge 
their impact on a variety of issues, both from an ex-ante and ex-post perspective. 
Although we have mentioned a number of ex-post studies that provided evaluations in 
terms of accessibility in the previous section, the focus of the research conducted here 
is on the possible impact of various student loan systems from an ex-ante viewpoint. In an international context, ex ante studies on higher education finance reform has 
relied mainly upon microsimulation techniques for their analysis.  
Harding (1995) uses a dynamic microsimulation model of 4000 Australian individuals 
to report the repayment profiles of males and females under the Australian ICL 
system Higher Education Contribution Scheme (HECS) and also the AUSTUDY 
supplement income-contingent scheme intended to for student maintenance purposes. 
Within this study it is assumed that each individual completes four years of higher 
education and receives a tuition loan similar to that of a full time student undertaking 
a standard course. There is also the assumption that each student takes on the 
maximum amount of AUSTUDY loan possible. The results show that 96% of the total 
HECS debt owed by males to the government was paid by the time they reach 
retirement age, with 93% of AUSTUDY debt paid in full by males over the same time 
frame. These figures are lower for the female population with 77% and 71% of total 
debt due from the HECS and AUSTUDY respectively from females being recouped 
by the government. Harding concludes that the majority of students who do not fully 
pay off their debt do manage to pay off a substantial amount of it and so the scheme is 
not fiscally insecure from a government revenue point of view. Glennerster et al 
(1995) investigate the impact of an income contingent loan system and graduate tax 
system on the repayment patterns of British graduates using the LIFEMOD 
microsimulation model. They conclude that an ICL system is favourable over the two 
especially from an equity standpoint. Showing similar findings to the Australian 
study, women on average pay back less than men with a range of 84% to 22% of male 
graduates paying their loan in full depending on the assumptions surrounding earnings 
growth and the interest rate attached to the student loan. This compares with a range 
of 61% to 10% of females that fully pay off their again dependent on the assumptions 
surrounding the loan system. Goodman et al (2002) estimate the redistributional 
impact of the introduction of a graduate tax in the UK using the tax-benefit 
microsimulation model TAXBEN. The study is conducted with the aim of estimating 
the ‘overnight’ effect of the imposition of a graduate tax in the UK and concludes that 
it may present some progressive qualities by placing a greater burden on graduates 
from higher income deciles.  Dearden at al (2007) use simulated lifetime earnings for 
graduates in England to analyse the distributional effects of changes to the higher 
education finance system in 2006. A number of assumptions are imposed such as each 
graduate has taken on three years of the maximum amount of debt allowed, both for 
tuition and maintenance
7. Their results show that the reforms have a positive 
redistributional impact, reducing the cost of higher education for those at the lower 
income distribution. 
Jacobs (2002) uses a similar methodology to simulate the lifecycle earnings of a 
sample of Dutch graduates at a micro level in examining the impact of a graduate tax 
or income contingent loan system. The study uses data containing information on 
variations in enrolment length and type of course pursued at the individual level in 
order to calculate the rate of graduate tax necessary to cover all state education 
expenditure in the Netherlands. The results show that a graduate tax scheme may 
exhibit a redistribution of income from males to females and/or from high earning 
graduates to low earning graduates. An income contingent loan system with risk 
sharing is also analysed under various assumptions regarding the repayment rates and 
the default risk to be levied on the student loans. The results show that repayment 
                                                 
7 Note: the amount debt that can be incurred from maintenance is dependent on household income  periods averaged nearly 40 years under all assumptions and upwards of 50% of total 
debt remaining unpaid by retirement age which may raise questions to the fiscal 
security involved, if the state is assumed to be the lender is the scheme.   
This paper utilizes the Lifecycle Income Analysis Model (LIAM), a dynamic 
microsimulation model for Ireland to investigate the potential impact of the 
introduction of an income contingent loan system or a graduate tax system within 
Ireland (O’Donoghue, 2010). The introduction of such a system would entail an 
income transfer from one period to another as individuals participating in higher 
education will have free access at point of entry but must pay back the cost over 
his/her lifecycle. To illustrate the potential impact of such a system over the lifecycle 
for Irish graduates, a dynamic microsimulation model is seen as an appropriate 
methodological tool. Given the important role of this microsimulation model in our 
estimations, we now provide a brief overview of the specific simulation processes 
carried out in forming LIAM.   
The LIAM model ages a sample of the Irish population, based upon the Living in 
Ireland survey data (1994-2001) up to 2050. The life-cycle processes that are 
simulated include demographic processes such as mortality, fertility and marriage, 
education, labour market processes such as employment and unemployment and the 
simulation of incomes and interactions with the tax/benefit system at the individual 
level.  It accounts for new individuals through simulated births and immigration and 
also allows for simulated death and emigration, consistent with official population 
projections (CSO, 1999). It thus maintains a representative sample of the population 
over time.  
Labour market status, including whether in work, unemployed, retired, the type of 
employment if in work, earnings and other characteristics are also modelled in the 
LIAM framework using a mixture of econometric models such as logit models and 
standard OLS regressions. Education level, age and parental education level are all 
important determinants of probabilities these factors within the future life histories of 
these variables within LIAM (O’Donoghue, 2010).   
The LIAM model also incorporates a static tax-benefit microsimulation model of the 
Irish tax-benefit system. Using the information provided by estimations on earnings 
and demographic status, the tax-benefit model serves to calculate disposable incomes, 
based on the parameters of the Irish tax-benefit system and amounts using actual 
values for the period 1994-2006. 
The combination of the above processes provide a simulated future for the entire 
population within the Living in Ireland dataset up to 2050. The education level 
completed of an individual in LIAM is disaggregated across four main headings, 
primary, lower secondary, upper secondary and tertiary. No distinction is made 
between those that complete different forms of tertiary education, such as degrees or 
diplomas or whether they attend a university or institute of technology. LIAM does 
provide us with the lifecycle earnings streams and employment patterns of each 
individual in our population
8. Table 2 below illustrates the education-earnings profile 
                                                 
8 These earnings are scaled to 2000 prices with an assumption of the real earnings growth rate equaling 
the real discount rate of 2%, this follows the Irish government’s present convention for discounting in 
public sector projects (Department of Finance, 2010).  of the population and shows the data following an expected path, with higher 
educated individuals earnings more over their lifetime, and also males earnings more 
then females. For the analysis in this paper it is the lifecycle of a particular cohort that 
is of interest. We identify those that have completed upper secondary education 
schooling and had completed tertiary education by the end of their 22nd year. We 
then track these individuals throughout their lifecycle until the point of retirement. As 
our simulated population runs from the years 2000 to 2050, this allows us to track the 
life cycle of eight cohorts of graduates until their point of retirement. Figure 2 
presents a picture of the simulated total lifecycle earnings distribution for our sample 
discounted to year 2000
9. A normal distribution plot within the figure illustrates the 
positively skewed nature of the earnings, providing comparison with similarly skewed 
earnings distribution studies on simulated graduate populations (Dearden et al, 2007). 
Figure 3 below presents the simulated average earnings for males and females 
graduates within LIAM throughout the lifecycle. The simulations suggest that 
earnings rise from around €15,000 for men and women to a peak of around €62,000 
(€32,000) for males (females) at age 57 (56). It must be noted that these figures are in 
constant year 2000 prices. The drop in both male and female earnings seen in figure 
as the simulated population moves towards age 60 is due to a large proportion of 
individuals in the higher earnings distribution retiring as they reach age 60, while 
those in the lower end continue to work until age 65. As we are interested in analysing 
the impact of alternative higher education finance systems within this framework, we 
must now specify the exact parameter of the systems to be simulated. 
Specification of ICL and Graduate Tax System within LIAM 
In this section we describe in practice how the two alternative higher education 
finance structures are simulated within LIAM. 
With the LIAM model disaggregating education level completed across four main 
headings this prohibits simulating different loan amounts to different individuals 
based upon course choice. It also prohibits looking at differences across part time or 
full time study. For the purposes of this analysis, these individuals were assumed to 
have completed 4 years of full time tertiary education between the ages of 19 and 22 
inclusive, and in the context of an ICL system to have received, during each of those 
years’ loans of €2500 per annum (in 2000 prices)
10. Therefore, each graduate is 
assumed to incur a debt of €10000 by the end of his/her stay in higher education. We 
assume payment begins as soon as their graduate with no grace period. We also 
initially assume there is no interest rate on the loan, but the principle is scaled every 
year by the increase in inflation
11, in other words there is a zero real interest rate 
attached to the loan. We also assume that there is no scope for early repayment in the 
system and there is no system for tracking emigrants.   
We investigate repayment of this simulated debt under two systems, the first of which 
is an income contingent loan system. We set the income threshold as the average 
                                                 
9 Total lifecycle earnings for an individual is the sum of earnings from ages 22-65 with an assumption 
of 2% real growth in earnings per annum and a 2% real discount applied 
10 Although it is not of consequence for our analysis whether these loans go towards covering tuition 
fees or maintenance, we assume this is solely a loan for fees, with the current system for maintenance 
grants staying in place 
11 This is assumed to be 2% per annum as per current government projections, we then apply a real 
discount rate of 2% in obtaining the present value for the year 2000.  income of those working for pay in our population for any given year. Any individual 
whose taxable income is below this threshold in a given year does not have to repay 
any amount in that year
12. This suggests an equitable income threshold as any 
graduate above this level can be said to be gaining some premium from higher 
education in the form of higher earnings. Individuals will pay 10% of any income 
earned above this threshold to service their loan. Also to incorporate more 
progressivity in the system, we also set a second threshold at 1.25 times the average 
income of those working for pay in our population for any given year. If an individual 
earns more than this they must pay 5% on any income earned above this second 
threshold as well as 10% on all income above the first (lower threshold)
13. The 
assumption is also made that these amounts are blanket thresholds at the individual 
level, with no allowances for no. of children and and/or spouse income or parental 
income level. Repayment stops once the loan amount has been repaid in full or when 
retirement is reached.  
This is in contrast to the graduate tax whereby repayments continue until the age of 
retirement regardless of how much is paid back with the result that high earnings may 
repay more than they have borrowed. In this paper we apply this graduate tax through 
the social insurance contributions system
14, with graduate forced to pay an additional 
1% on their pay related social insurance (PRSI) contributions until they retire. This 
applies to all classes of PRSI and has a progressive element in its design as the more 
an individual earns, the more they pay. We assume that this follows all the other rule 
surrounding PRSI contributions such as the PRSI ceiling.  
To incorporate these measures into LIAM we apply a tax/benefit microsimulation 
module upon the simulated future population of Ireland. This maps all taxes, social 
contributions and benefits incurred/received by our simulated population for the years 
2000-2050. The introduction of the two finance systems outlined above is achieved by 
inserting them into the tax/benefit microsimulation module. This allows us to track at 
an individual level, the scope and scale of both systems mentioned above.  As we do 
not have the tax/benefit rules for all future years, we initially vary the tax/benefit rules 
reflecting the real world from 2000-2006 for Ireland. We then hold the 2006 
tax/benefit rules constant for the rest of the simulated future. As our input data from 
LIAM is in 2000 prices, earnings and any other income variables that influence 
tax/benefit situations are up rated to the corresponding tax/benefit year, before 
applying the tax/benefit module. The relevant variables for the all years beyond 2006 
are up rated to the 2006 level and as they are subject to the 2006 tax/benefit rules. All 
output from this process are then converted back to 2000 prices. 
4.  Empirical Results  
The results of simulating two alternative higher education finance systems for Ireland 
using the LIAM dynamic microsimulation model will be analyzed in terms of 
repayment patterns, redistributional issues and from a fiscal viewpoint. When 
analyzing these figures it is important to note that they are quite sensitive to changes 
                                                 
12 This is similar to the design of the original Australian ICL system.   
13  While these repayment rates are chosen somewhat arbitrarily, they are based loosely upon the 
repayment rates that currently exist in the UK.    
14 A graduate tax system through PRSI contributions in Ireland has been put forward by the main 
opposition party at the time of writing. in the assumptions surrounding the simulations. Changing the assumptions regarding 
the loan amount, earnings growth and repayment structures within our model may 
drive these results in a different direction, however we will provide an analysis based 
on the assumptions set out previously and also with varying assumptions surrounding 




For the ICL system simulated, table3 indicates that for males, 83% of graduates pay 
back their loan in full when a zero real interest rate is applied to the debt. We also see 
that  there is a substantial gap across gender in terms of those who repay their debt in 
full with  74% of females doing so, compared to 91% of male graduates. These 
figures are slightly below that of the simulations presented by Harding (1995) for the 
Australian system. She finds that by the age of retirement, 96% of males and 77% of 
females have paid their tuition related loans. This may stem from the fact that the 
individuals in the Australian system pay a fraction of all taxable income after they 
reach a certain threshold, rather then just a fraction of income earned above this 
threshold. Our simulated repayment rates are above those found in Glennerster et al 
(1995) with respect to females as they find 62% of British females may repay back 
their loan in their simulated ICL system
16. The male repayment rate of 84% they find 
is also below the findings of our simulations. 
Males that do pay off their debt in full do so in an average of 13 years when the 
assumption of a zero real interest rate is applied, while females take 15 years on 
average. This is a similar repayment period to those in the Australian simulations 
where males and females take on average 12 and 15 years respectively. While for the 
UK Glennerster et al (1995) simulated 16 years and 22 years as the mean repayment 
period for males and females respectively. Dearden at al (2007) find that a variant of 
the UK system may bring down these figures for the UK, with the no. of years taken 
to repay the full debt at 13 and 17 years for males and females. Our repayment period 
may be undesirable from a policy perspective as this represents a considerable time 
for the government/university to wait for the full benefits of debt repayment to be 
fulfilled. In the context of males versus female repayment patterns our results are not 
surprising given the fact females earn less across the lifecycle, are more likely to 
leave the labour market and/or work part time than their male counterparts. 
Another are of interest with regard to the simulated ICL system is the level of subsidy 
provided by the government due to assumptions of the cancellation of the debt upon 
retirement and the level of interest charged on the loan. This is measured in table 3 
using the average net present value (NPV) of the repayments made by graduates 
compared to the initial loan of €10,000 the graduates receive. We can see the under 
the assumption of a zero real interest rate the average subsidy as a percentage of the 
                                                 
15 Some sensitivity analysis on the assumed discount rate applied is also presented in appendix 1 of the 
paper but not discussed at length within the empirical results. The main point of note, as seen in table 
A1 of appendix A, is that increasing the real discount rate by 1% does not affect the length of 
repayment of the income contingent loan but does have a significant impact upon the net present value 
amount the student repays under the ICL system. With respect to the graduate tax system, a 1% change 
in the real discount rate does little to impact the amount repaid relative to the simulated loan. 
 
16 This is under the assumption of 3% real earnings growth and 0% real interest rate on the loan. original loan amount is 62.7%. This figure arguably represents quite a generous 
subsidy towards the graduate and is a figure considerably higher than that estimated 
for the UK system by Dearden et al (2007). Barr (2005) and Barr and Falkingham 
(1996) argue that the interest subsidies to graduates within an ICL system from 
applying a zero real interest to the loan are particularly expensive, and given the 
government is the most likely source of ICL student loan system, this subsidy 
represents a large burden upon the taxpayer. The results presented in table 3 show that 
the ICL system simulated for Ireland here would seem to back up their findings.    
Table 3 also provides an analysis of the same issues discussed above with the 
assumption of a 2% real interest rate applied to the loan provided. It is shown that the 
proportion of graduates that repay the percentage of borrowers that repay the debt in 
full drops to 73%, with relatively equal drops in the proportion of those repaying the 
debt in full across gender. However, the imposition of the higher real interest rate 
does not have a major impact upon the average length of repayment for those that do 
pay off the loan in full by retirement age. With regard to the average loan subsidy to 
graduates provided by the government, the imposition of a 2% real interest rate on the 
loan substantially reduces this relative to that seen with a zero real interest rate. Again 
comparing the NPV of average repayments to the initial €10,000 loan provided shows 
that the average subsidy as a percentage of this loan falls to 18.5%, down from the 
figure of over 60% seen previously with the zero real interest rate. This would seem to 
support the claims of Barr (2005) that the level of the interest rate applied on any ICL 
system is vital in terms of the expense imposed upon the taxpayer. Our result suggest 
that within the system simulated here, a interest rate on the debt that corresponds to 
real interest rate of 2% is extremely effective in reducing this subsidy, compared to a 
situation of zero real interest rates.  
From a distributional point of view, we analyze the repayments patterns across deciles 
of the life cycle earnings distribution of graduates and across the two variants 
regarding the assumption of the interest rate charged upon the student loan.  From 
table 4 below, we can see that as a result of the income contingent nature of the 
system, our simulated ICL system is seems to hold progressive qualities.  
With a system of zero real interest rates, our results shows that 46% of those in the 
lowest lifecycle earnings decile end up paying back the full amount of their debt, 
compared to a figure of 100% of those in the highest income decile. We also see that 
the largest subsidy of the loan is also provided to those at the lower income deciles as 
they pay back the lowest amount on average (in NPV terms). However, it is also 
noticeable that the subsidy is quite large, even for those at the higher end of the 
graduate income distribution, standing at nearly 60% of the original loan amount.  
When the assumption regarding the real interest rate charged upon the loan is varied 
the system would still seem to hold its progressive nature. Although the amount 
repaid increases and the level of subsidy granted towards those in the lowest income 
decile falls, the subsidy to the higher earning graduates falls to zero while there still 
remains a substantial subsidy to the graduates at the bottom of the income 
distribution.  
An analysis of the ICL system simulated under both variants with respect to the level 
of interest rates suggests that the highest proportion of the loan that is not repaid 
comes from those that do not benefit from higher education through higher lifecycle earnings. Therefore, it could be suggested that the system simulated here satisfies both 
the equity and efficiency arguments surrounding higher education as nobody faces an 
upfront charge when entering higher education under this system and those that do not 
see their lifecycle earnings benefit substantially from higher education do not pay 
substantially towards its cost.   
Graduate tax 
We have also simulated a graduate tax scheme for Ireland to be implemented through 
the social insurance system. As a graduate tax system does not involve any loan, we 
do not examine this in terms of repayment rates or length of repayments. Instead we 
investigate the yield of such a scheme relative to the ICL system seen before. We 
investigate this under two different graduate tax rates and also with varying simulated 
debt amounts due to variations in the real interest rate surrounding the ICL system 
outlined earlier.  
From table 5a we see that a graduate tax system of an extra 1% on PRSI contributions 
would repay 146% of total borrowing under the assumption of a zero real interest rate 
on the debt. This is compared to just under 40% of all debt recovered from the ICL 
system under the same assumption. A graduate tax system involving an extra 2% of 
PRSI contributions would yield 287% of the total loan liability with the same interest 
rates involved. 
When the interest rate applied to the graduate debt is varied the yield of various 
graduate tax rates also varies. This is seen with table 5b, where a 1% graduate tax 
scheme would yield only 60% of simulated debt with the assumption of a 2% real 
interest rate on student loans. The simple reason for this is that while the amount 
taken in from the graduate tax does not change, the simulated debt will be higher. 
When the graduate tax system involves an extra 2% on PRSI contributions with same 
interest rate, the yield is shown as 118% of simulated debt.   
To gauge the implications of both graduate tax schemes against the original debt 
received by the graduate it is the results in table 5b that is of relevance. This provides 
the equivalent of estimating the yield of both graduate tax systems as a percentage of 
the original loan amount graduates get
17 and our results show that no government 
subsidy would be required under a 2% graduate tax scheme, while some substantial 
government subsidy would still exist under a 1% scheme. 
We can also see from table 6 that with the exception of graduates from all income 
distributions pay more under the graduate tax system than the ICL but the majority of 
the burden falls on those that earn the most over their lifecycle. This gives rise to the 
situation where richer graduates repay more than they would have borrowed under an 
ICL scheme and hence contribute to the education costs of poorer students. Although 
this type of system does have its advantages in terms of the revenue generated, 
Glennester et al (1995) find a similar result and argue against this from an equity 
point of view. They suggest that cost of higher education for poorer students should 
not fall on the richer graduates but on the tax payer, similar to any other redistributive 
measure. They also suggest that as the revenue from a graduate tax system may go to 
                                                 
17 This is due to the fact a 2% real interest rate attached to any student loan, combined with a 2% real 
discount rate will give the same NPV of the debt as the original amount borrowed. the state and not directly to higher education institutions, the benefits of such a system 
may not be accrued to educational resources.  
5.  Conclusion 
With increasing numbers of young people participating in higher education in Ireland 
and a heavy reliance of higher education institutions on state funding, the introduction 
of an alternative finance system for Ireland has been muted over the past number of 
years. However, no study has been conducted to gauge the potential impact of such 
measures. In this paper we utilize the dynamic microsimulation model LIAM to 
simulate the impact of both an income contingent loan system (ICL) and a graduate 
tax system from a fiscal and redistributional viewpoint and to analyze the repayment 
length under the former system. Under the ICL system we set a threshold based upon 
the average income of those working for pay in our population for any given year and 
find that 83% of graduates would pay back their loan in full by the age of retirement 
with a zero real interest rate attached to the repayments of students. This represents a 
slightly lower figure than studies conducted in Australia and is broadly in line with 
simulations conducted for the UK. We also find that the average subsidy provided to 
graduates by the zero real interest rate attached under this is quite generous and may 
be fiscally expensive. We also perform some sensitivity analysis with regard to the 
assumption surrounding the real interest rate attached to the loans involved and find 
that a 2% real interest rate may be more favourable from a fiscal viewpoint, while still 
holding progressive qualities. It must again be noted that these figures can be quite 
sensitive to changes in the various other assumptions underlying the ICL system we 
specifically simulated.  
From a distributional point of view we see that under the ICL schemes with both a 
zero and 2% real interest rate, those from the lower deciles of the lifecycle earnings 
distribution pay the least, and so the system does exhibit some degree of 
progressivity. However, from a policy perspective the low amount of the total debt 
repaid may suggest that any ICL system to be introduced may benefit from having a 
positive real interest rate attached. 
With the two variations of a graduate tax scheme simulated within the social 
insurance contributions of graduates we also find evidence of progressivity with those 
that earn the least over their lifecycle paying the least. However, our results also show 
that under the graduate tax scheme where an extra 1% is added to PRSI contributions, 
graduates on average pay back 1.45 times the amount they may have borrowed under 
an ICL system with a zero real interest rate. We again perform some sensitive tests 
here and find varying the extra percentage added to PRSI contributions as part of the 
graduate tax can vary this measure considerably. Our analysis suggests that a graduate 
tax scheme may have advantages over an ICL system in terms of the revenues it 
generates for the state, however, it does entail that richer graduates will pay for the 
education of poorer individuals. While we do not investigate the impacts of such 
systems upon participation rates, or the administrative costs of the alternative systems, 
this paper does provide the first step in measuring the possible impact of alternative 
higher education finance structures in Ireland. The LIAM model could be utilized in 
the future to simulate variants of the systems proposed here to attempt to find an 
optimal system from an equitable and efficiency viewpoint. References  
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 Table 1:   State proportion of total tertiary education expenditure across levels 
and selected countries for 1995 and 2007 
Country 2007  1995 
Ireland 85%  70% 
UK 35.8%  72% 
USA 31.6%  48% 
Italy 69.9%  91% 
Germany 84.7%  93% 
Australia 44.3%  73% 
OECD average  69.1%  86% 

















 Table2:  Present Value of Total Gross Lifecycle Earnings (€) across Education 
level and Gender (all in year 2000 values)  
Gender Education    level 
  Lower secondary  Upper secondary  Tertiary  
Male  427,826 748,078 988,813 
Female  155,901 340,624 658,120 
Source: Author’s Calculations LIAM 
Note: Earnings are assumed to grow by 2% in real terms each year while a real discount rate of 2% is 
applied Table 3:  Repayment Patterns for Graduates by Gender under an Income 
Contingent Loan System for Ireland with Two Different Interest Rates (Debt of 
€10,000) 
0% Real Interest Rate 
  % of Borrowers 
who Repay in Full  
Average Repayment 
Period in Years 
Average NPV of 
Repayments (€) 
Average Subsidy as a 
% of loan 
Females 74%  15.5  3,492  65% 
Males 91%  14.2  3,962  60.3% 
Total Average  83%  14.8  3,728  62.7% 
2% Real Interest Rate 
Females 62%  16.1  7,308  26.9% 
Males 85%  15.4  8,978  10.2% 
Total Average  73%  15.7  8,146  18.5% 
Source: Author’s Calculations LIAM 
Note: The average repayment period includes only those that had paid their loan in full 
Note: The NPV of repayments are repayments discounted to the year of graduation of each graduate  Table 4:  Repayment Patterns for Graduates by Decile of Graduate Lifecycle 
Earnings Distribution under an Income Contingent Loan System for Ireland 
with Varying Interest Rates (Debt of €10,000) 
Decile  % of Borrowers 




Period in Years 
Average NPV of 
Repayments (€) 
Average 
Subsidy as a % 
of loan 
Real Interest Rate = 0% 
1 46%  24.8  2,880  71.2% 
2 50%  21.1  3,015  69.8% 
3 82%  22.7  3,674  63.3% 
4 84%  18.8  3,937  60.6% 
5 84%  18.5  3,988  60.1% 
6 92%  15.3  3,977  60.2% 
7 93%  11.8  3,769  60.3% 
8 100.0%  9.3  4,033  59.7% 
9 100.0%  8.4  4,055  59.4% 
10 100.0%  6.5  4,056  59.4% 
        
Real Interest Rate = 2% 
1 25%  23.1  4,557  54.4% 
2 31%  19.75  4,946  50.5% 
3 61%  24.7  7,586  24.3% 
4 72%  23.0  8,240  17.6% 
5 76.0%  21.5  8,423  15.7% 
6 85%  17.5  9,200  8.0% 
7 88%  14.6  9,055  9.15% 
8 100%  9.2  10,000  0.0% 
9 100%  9.6  10,000  0.0% 
10 100%  7.5  10,000  0.0% 
Source: Author’s Calculations LIAM 
Note: The average repayment period includes only those that had paid their loan in full 
Note: The NPV of repayments are repayments discounted to the year of graduation of each graduate  
 Table 5a:  Graduate Tax revenue as per cent of Total Simulated Loan Liability 
with Zero Real Interest Rate 
  Yield of 1% Graduate Tax   Yield of 2% Graduate Tax 
Females 127.2  253.0 
Males 163.8  322.4 
Total Average  145.8  287.9 
Source: Author’s Calculations LIAM 
 
Table 5b:  Graduate Tax revenue as per cent of Total Simulated Loan Liability 
with 2% Real Interest Rate 
  Yield of 1% Graduate Tax   Yield of 2% Graduate Tax 
Females 52.3  104.0 
Males 67.4  132.5 
Total Average  60.0  118.3 
Source: Author’s Calculations LIAM Table 6:  Average Amount Paid by Graduates by Retirement Age under a 
Graduate Tax System of by Decile of Lifecycle Earnings Distribution and 
Varying Tax Rates  
Decile of lifecycle earnings distribution  Average NPV of Repayments (€)  






















Source: Author’s Calculations LIAM 
Note: The NPV of repayments are repayments discounted to the year of graduation of each graduate  Figure 1: Marginal Private and Social Benefits to Education versus the Marginal 
Cost of Education 
 




























P2Figure 2: Simulated Present Value Lifecycle Earnings Distribution for 
Graduates within LIAM (All in year 2000 prices) 
 
Source: Author’s calculation LIAM 
Note: Total lifecycle earnings for an individual is the sum of earnings from ages 22-65 with an 
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Source: Author’s calculation LIAM 
Note: Earnings are subject to the assumption of 2% real growth in earnings per annum and a 2% real 
discount applied Appendix A: Sensitivity Analysis with respect to the discount rate  - Repayment 
Patterns for Graduates by Gender under an Income Contingent  
 
Table A1: Loan System for Ireland with Two Different Interest Rates and Real 
Discount Rate of 3% (Debt of €10,000) 
  % of Borrowers 
who Repay in 
Full  
Average Repayment 
Period in Years 
Average NPV of 
Repayments (€) 
Average Subsidy 
as a % of loan 
0% Real Interest Rate 
Females 74%  15.65  2,303  77% 
Males 91%  14.3  2,610  73.9% 
Total Average  83%  14.8  2,457  75.4% 
2% Real Interest Rate 
Females 60%  16.1  4,740  52.6% 
Males 85%  15.4  5,814  41.9% 
Total Average  73%  15.7  5,279  47.2% 
Source: Author’s Calculations LIAM 
Note: The average repayment period includes only those that had paid their loan in full 
Note: The NPV of repayments are repayments discounted to the year of graduation of each graduate  Table A2a: Graduate Tax as per cent of Total Simulated Loan Liability with 
Zero Real Interest Rate and Real Discount Rate of 3% 
  Yield of 1% Graduate Tax   Yield of 2% Graduate Tax 
Females 126.1  251.0 
Males 162.4  319.7 
Total Average  144.3  285.4 
Source: Author’s Calculations LIAM 
 
Table A2b: Graduate Tax as per cent of Total Simulated Loan Liability with 2% 
Real Interest Rate and Real Discount Rate of 3% 
  Yield of 1% Graduate Tax   Yield of 2% Graduate Tax 
Females 52.3  104.0 
Males 67.3  132.5 
Total Average  60.0  118.3 
Source: Author’s Calculations LIAM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 